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“IF YOU BUY A CUP, WHY WOULD YOU NOT USE IT?” 
MARITAL RAPE: THE ACCEPTABLE FACE OF GENDER BASED VIOLENCE 
Fareda Banda* 
There are cases that one never forgets. DPP v. Morgan is one of  those for me.1 I read it as an eighteen-year-
old in my first year of  law school. It was in the criminal law class where we were being taught about rape. The 
facts left me shocked and outraged. Morgan went out drinking with his friends. At the end of  the night, he 
invited the friends back to his house. He told them that they could have sex with his wife and added that they 
should not worry if  she appeared to resist, because she liked it that way. The friends duly came over and 
helped themselves to his wife as per his instructions. Morgan also forced her to have sex with him despite her 
protestations. She experienced injuries which necessitated medical treatment. His friends were convicted of  
rape, but he was convicted of  indecent assault. This seemed strange. Had they all not forced her to have sex 
with them despite her clearly expressed refusal? Why was he charged with a lesser crime? The reason was 
simple: he was her husband. Under the law as it then operated in England, there was no recognition of  
marital rape. Her consent to lifelong sex on demand, even if  it was against her will, was taken as part of  the 
contract of  marriage. The words “I do” spoken at the time of  the marriage, were taken to mean free access 
for the husband for as long as they both lived, or until the marriage was legally dissolved or a formal separa-
tion was in place. 
Despite normative progress on gender-based violence at the international and regional level, discussed by 
Randall and Venkatesh in their essay in this symposium, marital rape remains a problem globally.2 As they 
note, nonconsensual sex in marriage constitutes gender-based violence, which has been defined by the Com-
mittee on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) as: “violence that is 
directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately. It includes acts 
that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of  such acts, coercion and other deprivations 
of  liberty.”3  
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1 DPP v. Morgan [1976] AC 182 (HL). 
2 Melanie Randall & Vasanthi Venkatesh, Criminalizing Sexual Violence against Women in Intimate Relationships: State Obligations Under 
Human Rights Law, 109 AJIL UNBOUND 189, 190 (2015). 
3 Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation 19, para. 6, UN Doc. A/47/38 (1992). 
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Rationales for Tolerating Marital Rape 
Wifely consent to sexual intercourse with her husband has been, and continues to be, embedded in many 
societies within the marital contract by common law, religion (including obedience laws and the invocation of  
the notion of  the “submissive wife”), and, finally, customary law.4 The Personal Status Act of  Yemen of  
1992, for example, reinforces the idea that the marital contract is based on wifely obedience: 
Article 40. A husband has the right to be obeyed by his wife in the interest of  the family, especially in 
regard to the following: 
1. She must move with him to the conjugal home, unless she has stipulated in the marriage contract 
that she must remain in her own home or her family’s home, in which case she must permit him to 
live with her and have access to her; 
2. She must permit him to have legitimate intercourse with her when she is fit to do so. (emphasis added)  
In patrilineal societies in parts of  Africa, men convey gifts/bride wealth to the families of  their future 
wives.5 This is for three reasons: the first is to secure the “right” of  the husband to have the children belong 
to his family line (genetrical rights), the second is to secure exclusive sexual access to the woman (uxorial 
rights), and the third is to compensate the family of  origin for the transfer of  the woman’s labour to the 
husband’s family. It is in the claim to uxorial rights that the problem of  marital rape arises. For some men, the 
giving of  bride wealth acts as a down payment for sex on demand. A Ugandan man who was asked about his 
views on marital rape asked quizzically: “Why would you buy a cup and not use it?”6 The idea of  rape within 
marriage was, for him, a nonsense. CEDAW has described bridewealth as a harmful practice in its dialogue 
with the government of  Uganda.7 Significantly, it also expressed concern about the “high prevalence of  
domestic violence” and of  “sexual offences against women and girls.”8 
The idea of  bridewealth giving rise to, or being used to justify, gender-based violence was raised by Mifumi, 
a Ugandan women’s advocacy group, in its partly-successful appeal to the Constitutional Court to outlaw the 
practice as a violation of  women’s rights. In Mifumi v. Attorney General, the Court refused to link bridewealth to 
violence against women, noting that gender-based violence was a global phenomenon not confined to Ugan-
da.9 Such violence also happens in places where no bridewealth is paid. The court did however declare that 
the requirement that the wife’s family return a portion of  the bridal gift if  she wanted a divorce was indeed a 
breach of  the Constitution’s guarantee of  gender equality and should be struck down. This portion of  the 
judgement recognizes that it is economic dependency that ties women to difficult marriages and that remov-
ing the repayment requirement will go some way to freeing those women who want to leave their unions.  
The importance of  this refusal to recognize the link between bridewealth and gender-based violence within 
marriage can be seen by looking at The Muslim Personal Law Act of  Sudan (1991), which provides in Section 
91 that: 
 
4 The nonrecognition of  same sex marriage in many societies means that the crime is still conceived in heteronormative terms. 
Indeed, it is telling that it is in those societies that are most resistant to permitting same sex marriages, or indeed recognizing the rights 
of  same sex people, that still permit husbands to rape their wives. 
5 The exchange of  gifts is known by different names including lobolo, bogadi, (Southern Africa) ti-aseda (Akans), idana (Yoruba), maha-
ri (Swahili) ikpo onu aku nwayi (Yoruba). 
6 CHANGE, Non Consensual Sex in Marriage, Marriage, Culture and Violence: Messages from the Survey (2002). 
7 CEDAW, Concluding Observations: Uganda, para. 20, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/UGA/CO/7 (Oct. 22, 2010). 
8 Id. at para. 23. 
9 Mifumi (U) v. Attorney-General, [2015] UGSC 13 (Uganda). 
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Except in situations involving a violation of  Shari’a law, a wife shall always obey her husband if  he: 
(a) has paid her dowry in full, 
(b) could be entrusted with her, and 
(c) provides her with a home that complies with the Shari’a requirement among good neighbors. (em-
phasis added). 
Section 92 goes on to say that, “[i]f  the wife refuses to obey her husband, her right to be provided with a living 
ceases to be valid during such refusal.”10 
Research undertaken in different African states seems to suggest that women internalize their “duty” to 
have intercourse with their husbands on demand so that they do not always conceive of  coercive sex as 
illegal. They see it, rather, as part of  the marital bargain that they struck, or that their relatives struck on their 
behalf.11   
While the marital rape exemption was overturned in England in 1992, it remains, like homophobic laws 
also exported by the British, in place in many former colonies. The Bahamas is one such state. Its Sexual 
Offences and Domestic Violence Act (1991) provides in Section 3 that “[r]ape is the act of  any person not 
under fourteen years of  age having sexual intercourse with another person who is not his spouse.” The 
statute further clarifies that consent will be vitiated when: “impersonating the spouse of  that other person.”12 
The husband’s proprietal rights in the wife and her body are reinforced by the impersonation clause.  
Marriage adds a new dimension to sexual coercion. It comes freighted with expectation of  love, security, 
and support. What then is a woman to do, if  instead, it becomes the source of  terror? Who does she tell if  
telling is the equivalent of  exploding the marriage? How much harder is it if  there are children, if  one belongs 
to a church community, if  one had a big wedding, if  everyone thinks he is a great guy, if  you would lose face, 
or worse, your family would be embarrassed if  this became public? All these factors help to explain why it is 
that the few recorded marital rape cases that exist were brought after the couple had separated.13 Indeed, 
Roman Dutch law, the legacy of  which is still to be found in former Dutch colonies and their neighbours, 
used to require the couple to have separated before a marital rape claim could be brought.14 
Perversions: Rape Leading to Marriage 
Marital rape is but one manifestation of  on-going, pervasive, gender-based violence that affects women in 
most societies. Sometimes rape can be used as the precursor to marriage. There are capture marriages where a 
man abducts a woman and keeps her from her family, sometimes raping her and “making her his wife.” In 
conservative societies that prize virginity as a condition of  marriage, a woman violated in this way may feel 
compelled to remain with the man as his wife, enduring a lifetime of  violation.15 Although the Human Rights 
Committee has condemned this practice and called for its eradication, it continues.16 According to Equality 
 
10 The Muslim Personal Law Act of Sudan, 1991, EQUALITY NOW.  
11 Gathered in FAREDA BANDA, WOMEN, LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 172-176 (2005). 
12 The Sexual Offences and Domestic Violence Act, 1991 (Bah.), EQUALITY NOW. 
13 There are still jurisdictions that permit religious tribunals to pronounce on divorce. This may result in a woman relying on the 
rapist-husband to release her from their contract of  marriage. 
14 H v. H 1999 (2) ZLR 358 (Zim.). 
15 South African Law Reform Commission, The Practice of Ukuthwala, REVISED DISCUSSION PAPER 138 (2015); Chelete Monyane, Is 
Ukuthwala another form of ‘Forced Marriage’?, 44 S. AFR. REV. SOC. 64 (2013). 
16 UN Human Rights Comm., General Comment 28, Equality of  Rights Between Men and Women (Article 3), para. 24, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (2000).  
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Now: “Sections 199(1) and 200 of  Malta’s Criminal Code reduce the penalty for abduction if  the perpetrator 
intends to marry the victim on abduction and exempts the perpetrator from prosecution and punishment if  
that person does in fact marry the person abducted.”17  
Article 522 of  Lebanon’s Penal Code stops prosecution or execution of  a penalty when the perpetrator of  
a rape, kidnapping, or statutory rape marries the person he has raped or kidnapped.18 
In privatizing violence in this way, there is an abrogation of  the state responsibility of  due diligence which 
includes prosecuting and punishing offenders. Rape statutes that allow marriage in mitigation reward violence. 
There is also a total ignorance about the systemic and structural discrimination that forces women to “con-
sent” to marry their rapists—a reinforcement of  gendered inequalities.19    
The Need for a Holistic Approach 
Given structural inequalities, amending the laws to penalize marital rape is at best a partial solution. Per-
haps more important than calling for such criminalization is the call made by feminist scholars who have 
advocated for a more holistic, transformative model of  equality that tackles structural discrimination.20 
CEDAW has stressed the importance of  such a model. While the Committee thus recognizes the importance 
of  removing discriminatory legislation which permits marital rape, it also calls upon states to encourage their 
populations to change attitudes using education and other means. A brief  glance at cases pertaining to vio-
lence against women that have been considered by the Committee under its Optional Protocol shows that it 
focuses on gender stereotyping as both cause and consequence of  the violence that is the subject of  the 
complaint. The Committee regularly cites Article 5(a) on states’ obligations to “modify the social and cultural 
patterns of  conduct of  men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of  prejudices and custom-
ary and all other practices which are based on the idea of  the inferiority or the superiority of  either of  the 
sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.” The case of  Vertido v. Philippines concerned a woman who 
had been raped by a work colleague. She had reported the rape but had been met by disbelief  by police and 
medical personnel. At trial, the judges invoked rape myths about the expected behaviour of  a “proper” rape 
victim. The appeal to the CEDAW Committee was to challenge this stereotyping. Finding in her favor, the 
Committee requested the state to:  
Ensure that all legal procedures in cases involving crimes of  rape and other sexual offenses are impar-
tial and fair, and not affected by prejudices or stereotypical gender notions. To achieve this, a wide 
range of  measures are needed, targeted at the legal system, to improve the judicial handling of  rape 
cases, as well as training and education to change discriminatory attitudes towards women.21 
 
17 Criminal Code (Malta), EQUALITY NOW. Equality Now notes that while Article 308 of the Palestinian Penal Code No. 16 of 
1961 also exempts a perpetrator of rape, kidnapping, and statutory rape from prosecution and punishment if he marries his victim, it 
retains the possibility of reviving the prosecution. 
18 The Penal Code (Leb.), EQUALITY NOW.  
19 Criminal Code (Malta), EQUALITY NOW. 
20 Rikki Holtmaat, Article 5, in THE UN CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN: 
A COMMENTARY 141 (Marsha A. Freeman et al. eds., 2013); REBECCA COOK & SIMONE CUSACK, GENDER STEREOTYPING: TRANSNA-
TIONAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (2010); OHCHR Gender Stereotyping as a Human Rights Violation (2013). 
21 CEDAW, Vertido v. Phil. Communication No. 18/2008, para. 8(9)(b), UN Doc. CEDAW/C/46/18/2008, (Sept. 1, 2010). See 
also, CEDAW, A.T. v. Hung, Communication No. 2/2003, UN Doc. CEDAW/32/D/2/2003 (Jan. 26, 2005), CEDAW, Isatou 
Jallow v. Bulg., Communication No. 32/2011, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/52/D/32/2011 (Aug. 28, 2012). 
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More recently the Committee has added a General Recommendation on Access to Justice, in recognition 
of  the barriers (not just legal but also institutional, social, cultural, and economic) that face women seeking to 
vindicate their rights.22  
The refusal of  many states to outlaw marital rape in breach of  human rights obligations voluntarily under-
taken speaks to a disregard for women and reinforces unequal power relations within marriage. Instead such 
states choose to use the right to privacy and “family harmony” as the reasons for not protecting women. 
Criminalizing rape in marriage is a start. Equally important is making provision for separation and divorce 
without sacrificing financial support. Women’s economic dependency explains why, for many, marriage re-
mains the only career option. Its sustenance, at any cost, including rape, is often the price paid.23  
What is required is transformative equality that goes beyond legal change to take in attitudes. With this in 
mind, the answer to the question the Ugandan man is alleged to have asked: “Why would you buy a cup if  
you could not use it?” is simple; women are people not cups. 
 
22 CEDAW, General Recommendation 33, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/33, (July 23, 2013). 
23 See for example the Democratic Republic Law 87-010 on the Family Code which gives the husband marital power over the wife 
including controlling her property, movements, and deciding where the family is to live, Law 87-010 on the Family Code (Dem. Rep. 
Congo), EQUALITY NOW.  
